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Abstract
Our smal1 empirical stock-flow model for the Dutch economy, which endogenizes
the adjustment dynamics to (un)employment search equilibria, identifies two
mechanisms  that caused persistente  in labor market adjustments: (i) job
competition from non-participants, and (ii) asymmetrie  adjustments to cyclical
shocks. At the core  of the model is an estimated matching function. Using Dutch
flow data for the period 1970-1997 we tìnd that the search effectiveness of
individuals on welfare benefïts and non-participation is 0.33 respectively 0.05 of
the search effectiveness of individuals receiving unemployment insurance. In
accordance with actual developments in the reference period, our model
simulations show that, when  the flow from non-participants into the labor market
rises permanently, the unemployment rate rises quickly and stabilizes at a higher
leve1 whereas employment continues to rise. Yet, a sensitivity analysis with
altemative assumptions on the type of supply shocks and the reaction of labor
demand to these shocks indicates  that the adjustment dynamics, and hence the
degree of persistente,  depend much  on the search behavior of non-participants.
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1. Introduction
This paper investigates the role played by labor supply shocks, social security and the business
cycle in the rise and persistente  of unemployment in The Netherlands over the period 1970-
1997. During the 1970s and 1980s The Netherlands witnessed a dramatic  rise in the
unemployment rate.  This rise was characterized by a number of upward jumps; steady state
unemployment seemed to move to a higher  leve1 after each cyclical downtum. According to the
OECD (1998) total unemployment in The Netherlands is around 1.5 million workers (17 percent
of the labor force), including official unemployment and unemployment hidden in occupational
disability and temporary illness provisions. If we take the share of workers receiving social
benefits as an indication of ‘inactivity’, we find that since the mid 1980s ‘inactivity’ has
stabilized at around 20 percent of the labor force.
Most European countries witnessed the same dramatic  rise and persistente  in unemployment
(see e.g. Bean (1994)). However, in The Netherlands the persistente  in social benefïts and
unemployment ratios occurred despite rising employment. In 1975, 61 percent of the working
age population in The Netherlands was employed, whereas the average participation rate in the
European Union  was 64 percent. Since the mid 1980s the average growth of employment was
2.0% in The Netherlands, versus 0.9% percent in the European Union  (OECD (1999)). The
employment rate in The Netherlands is nowadays, with 68 percent, even above the European
average of 61 percent (European Commission (1999)).
The Dutch paradox of increased employment and persistent social benefit  dependency raises the
question of who  filled  the newly created jobs? The data suggest that it was mainly non-
participants  (most notably school leavers and women  re-entering the labor market) who
benefited from the rising number of jobs in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. This
suggests that receivers of social security benefits witnessed fierce competition from non-
participants  when  searching for new jobs. This observation inspired US to investigate job
competition from non-participants as a major mechanism that caused persistente  in
unemployment by means of a smal1 empirical stock-flow model for the Dutch economy. The
model makes the adjustment dynamics to (un)employment search equilibria endogenous.
Additionally, in our modeling experiment, we also considered another, related mechanism as a
cause of unemployment persistente,  namely asymmetrie  adjustments to cyclical shocks.
In this way our paper adds to the large body of literature on several other factors which may
prevent a quick return of the unemployment rate to its long run equilibrium after  a labor demand
or supply shock, and which therefore may explain unemployment persistente.  We mention
employment adjustment costs for firms,  adjustment costs for workers (e.g. costs involved in
labor force participation), wage-price staggering effects, and insider-outsider effects. Yet in
recent years’ hazardous welfare state  dynamics have been added fo this list, so that factors that
are related to the mechanisms  of our paper are nowadays considered important causes  of
unemployment persistente,  notably in Europe. These factors relate  to loss of skills in
unemployment, declining job search efforts of receivers of social security benefïts and
increasing social acceptance of long term social welfare dependency (Bean (1994), Lindbeck
(1995),  Snower (1997)).
An analysis of the process  of matching job seekers and vacanties  can provide information on
the impact of policy measures that intend to increase labor force participation. Our analysis
shows that promoting labor force participation stimulates employment but may lead to a
substantial rise in unemployment for a prolonged period, in particular when prolonged
unemployment leads to a reduction of the average search effectiveness of unemployed job
seekers, as our estimation results indicate.
The paper has the following outline. Section 2 specifies  the flow model of the labor market,
which describes the propagation of shocks and the resulting dynamic  adjustments to search
equilibria. Using flow data for the Dutch labor market over the period 1970-1997, Section 3
presents the estimation results for the parameters in the matching function, which allows for
job-competition between unemployed workers, receivers of welfare benefits and non-
participants.  It also describes how  the baseline  simulation model is calibrated to a search
equilibrium which concords with actual data on labor flows and stocks. Section 4 gives the
simulation results for the propagation of supply shocks, cyclical (demand) shocks and presents a
sensitivity analysis with respect to the implementation of the shocks. Finally, a summary of the
main findings and some concluding remarks are given in Section 5.
2. The model
.
A major feature of our model is that it explicitly describes the short run transition dynamics
from an old to a new (un)employment search equilibrium in case of permanent shocks, or the
dynamics of the return to the old equilibrium after a temporary shock. So, in contrast to
traditional dynamic  policy models which describe adjustment mechanisms  at an ad hoc basis,
e.g. by an error correction mechanism,  our model derives its adjustment from the passage of
time implicit  in the search process (see also Den Butter and Van Dijk (1998), Den Butter and
Gorter (1999)). Because our model focuses  so much on adjustment dynamics  the calibrated
version of the model used in the simulation experiments is specifïed on a monthly basis.
According to the model, individuals in the working age population can be in one of four states
on the labor market: employment (E),  unemployment and receiving insurance benefïts (UI),
unemployment and receiving welfare benefits (WZ3)  and non-participation (N).  Unemployed
workers entitled to unemployment benefits (i.e. unemployment insurance) are unemployed
workers with a recent history of labor force attachment. When this insurance benefit  expires, the
unemployed worker is entitled to welfare benefits. Welfare recipients mainly consist of long-
term unemployed workers. Jobs in the labor market can be either filled and producing (E) or
vacant and searching (V). The distribution of workers and jobs over the different states depends
on the flows between them. The flow rates  into employment are endogenous and are determined
by the matching function. The other flow rates,  and hence the respective  transition probabilities
are exogenous in the model and are calibrated using data on actual transition probabilities. The
stocks and flows in the model are given in Figure 1. The dashed lines  represent the endogenous
flows; the solid lines represent the exogenous flows.
At the core  of the model is the matching process that describes the competition of the three
different groups of job searchers in their effort to fïll existing job vacanties.  This makes the
inflow into employment from the three different groups and hence the transition probabilities
endogenous. Three matching functions determine the speed at which job seekers and vacanties
are matched. The matching functions for the three groups of job seekers are given by
where M,, 0, and Si denote the number of matches for, the search effectiveness  of and the stock
of job seekers from state  i. V denotes the stock of vacanties.  c and CI are matching technology
parameters. The matching functions for the three groups of job seekers can be aggregated to
yield a constant-returns-to-scale aggregate matching function, which is typically not rejected in
empirical work on the Dutch labor market (Van Ours (1991), Broersma  and Van Ours (1999).
The aggregated matching function then reads
PI M = cVa(CeiSi)l-a,
where M is the number of matches, and hence the inflow into employment, in a given time
interval. In the next section we estimate the parameters of the matching function using data for
the period 1970-1997.
Figure 1 - Stocks and flows in the labor market
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The remainder of our simple model consists of the equations of motion,  which describe the
technical relationships that, by definition, exist between the stocks and flows. The following
four equations determine the stocks of UI, N, WB and E in period c by their values in the
previous period - the period in the model is one month - and the net result  of inflows and
outflows in that period..
a
[31 UI, = UI,-, +7tE+",  ' E,-, -nuIdwB 'UI,-, -c. %r,r-IW-l '
WB, = WB,-,  + z”,-,~~ . UI,-, + nN+WB - N,-,cl
[41
-nWB+N  .WB,-,  -c- JJ,,  ,,-,  WB,-,,
N, = N,-, + nE+,,,  - E,-,  + qvB-+,.,  . WB,-l
and
- nN-,WB  . N,-,  -c . - %,,-,  N,-,  9
[el E, = E,-,  -nE+",  .E,-,  -~~e+~  .E,-,  +c.V"c~e;  ,,-, S; ,,-, )'-?
where 71x+ denotes the flow rate from state x to state  y.
These flow rates,  or transition probabilities are the major determinants in the equations of
motion.  As mentioned before, in the present version of the model these rates are kept
exogenous. The following shortly discusses these flow rates.
- Flow rate from  employment to unemployment insurance ( nE+“[ ). In our model we make the
simplifying assumption that al1 workers who  become unemployed are entitled to
unemployment insurance benefits. In reality a smal1 portion of the new inflow into
unemployment receive  welfare bene%, notably those workers with a very  short
employment history. Our assumption of a fixed flow rate from employment to
unemployment insurance is supported by the stylized fact  that lay-offs into unemployment
are mainly driven by firm-specific  shocks and that the business cycle has a limited impact
on the size of the inflow into unemployment (Davis, Haltiwanger and Schub (1996))‘.
- Flow rate from employment to non-participation ( nE+N ).  This flow represents workers who
leave the workforce permanently (retirement and early retirement) or temporarily (for
example disabled workers who  might return to their job when  recovered and workers who
leave the labor force temporarily to take care  of young children). The inflow into non-
* participation for reasons of (early) retirement or disability is highly influenced by policy
changes in these social benefit  schemes.  It tums out however that the aggregate inflow into
’ Modeling the rate at which job-worker matches dissolve as a constant is a common feature of search models of
the labor market (see Van den Berg and Ridder (1998)).
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non-participation from these three sources is between 2 and 3 percent of the employed labor
force for the period 1970-1997 (Koek (1998)).
- Flow rate from welfare benefits to non-participation (n,,,,,  ).  There are a number of
reasons why people can loose entitlement to their welfare benefit. The most common reason
is a change in the personal circumstances, for example when a benefit  recipient  moves in
with a person who  is employed. In extreme cases a person can loose his benefit  if he does
not comply with the job search requirements. This flow rate could be influenced by policy
changes, but these appear to have been limited in The Netherlands.
- Flow rate from non-participation to welfare benefits (7~,,,+~~  ). This flow represents school-
leavers who  become unemployed or persons who  experience a change in their personal
circumstances that makes them eligible for welfare benefits (e.g. divorce). We use this
variable to implement changes in the supply of labor from non-participants in our model.
- Flow rate from unemployment insurance to welfare benefits ( 7tU,+wB  ).  In The Netherlands,
after six to forty-eight  months, depending on the individual’s employment history,
entitlement to unemployment benefits expires. Subsequently unemployed workers receive
welfare benefits. 7rU,+wB can therefore also be interpreted as the transition rate from short-
term to long-term unemployment. At the macro leve1 this rate depends on the duration
structure  of the stock of workers receiving unemployment insurance benefits. We leave this
refinement for future research.
Finally we have to make an assumption about the reaction of labor demand,  represented by the
stock of vacanties,  to autonomous shocks that bring the model out of its search equilibrium. In
our baseline  model we assume that labor demand adjusts so as to keep the ratio of vacanties
over the number of effective job seekers (VZ?;  0, Si) unchanged after a labor supply shock, as
suggested by search theory (see e.g. Pissarides (2000),  Chapter 3). This implies that in response
to a positive (negative) shock to labor supply vacanties  jump above (below) their steady-state
leve1 for as long as the effective supply of labor deviates from the steady state  level. The
rationale behind this is that wage and search costs  fa11 as the effective supply of labor rises
above its steady state  level. In this case the number of vacanties  is given by
[71 V, =V* +((e. ,,,-, UI,-, +&,-,WB,-, +en.;-,N,-,  -&,UI* -@,.,WB*  -e,J*),
where V*, UZ*, WB* and N* denote the steady-state levels of the respective  stocks in the new
equilibrium after  the shock. To keep the ratio of vacanties  to effective job seekers constant in
our baseline  model we set the vacancy adjustment parameter 5 equal to V*/Ei  0; S*i.
This baseline  version  of the reaction of labor demand to shocks assumes immediate adjustment
of the number of vacanties  to the effective number of job seekers. As an altemative, we also
conducted simulation experiments, where the number of vacanties  does not change in reaction
to a shock. This extreme situation we label the lump of labor assumption. In this case we set 4
equal to zero.
The model [2] - [7] is an empirical implementation of an equilibrium search model with
heterogeneous job searchers (Pissarides (2000)). Competition from non-participants is expected
to reduce the outflow probability of unemployed workers to employment. The impact of
changes in the degree of competition from unemployed job seekers on the individual job
seeker’s outflow probability to employment depends on labor market tightness, i.e. on the leve1
of unemployment and the stock of vacanties  (Layard,  Nickell and Jackman (1991)). Obviously
the same applies to individual job seekers outside the labor force. A higher  unemployment rate
reduces the matching probability for the individual, ceteris paribus.
These search extemalities can generate  inefficient  labor market outcomes as job seekers, in
making their individual job search decisions, do not take into account the effect their individual
decision has on the job-finding probability of other job seekers in the labor market and hence on
the impact their individual job search decisions have on the unemployment rate and on
macroeconomic efficiency. The same applies to employers posting vacanties.  In our model
search extemalities are captured as, through the matching function and the endogenous
adjustment process,  changes in labor supply from one group (e.g. non-participants) influence the
matching probabilities of other groups and the unemployment rate.
3. Estimation and calibration
In order to estimate the parameters of the matching functions [ 11, and to calibrate the equations
Öf the remainder of the model, we need time-series of job and worker flows at the macro level.
We use data for the Dutch labor market that has become recently available (see Koek (1998,
2000) and Broersma, Den Butter and Koek (2000)). The data is constructed with a national
accounting methodology. The basic idea of this methodology is that, given a number of stocks
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and flows from primary sources and some assumptions, missing time-series can be constructed
using the simple accounting rule which states that the change in a stock equals the inflow minus
outflow in a given period. The accounting system is made consistent because al1 relevant groups
in the labor market are included and the restriction is imposed that flows cannot yield negative
values. Data on successful job matches of unemployed workers receiving unemployment
benefits is obtained from primary administrative data sources front the Dutch National Institute
for Social Insurance (LISV). Time series on successful matching from short-term
unemployment, disability and non-participation for example are constructed using the national
accounting method. The flows between unemployment and non-participation and the outflow
from unemployment are also included in the accounting system of labor market flows. In this
paper we use annual data because these are available for the period 1970-1997, whereas
consistent quarterly flow data could only be constructed starting 1988. The appendix provides
details on each of the time series used in this paper.
Estimating the mafching function
The previous section discussed that inflow into employment is determined by the matching
i 1
1-C2
function M = cVa xtliSi . We assume that al1 three types of job seekers face the same
I
degree of mismatch and search frictions, i.e. they al1 face, a common c. If we normalize the
search effectiveness of individuals receiving unemployment insurance benefits to 1, we can
estimate the following equation
[81 M =c.Va .(UZ+exp(8’,).WB+exp(8’,).N)‘-* +E.
The estimation results are given in Table 1. We use a non-linear iterative estimation procedure
and we correct for lïrst order auto-correlation.
Table 1 - Estimation results
c o! 8’,,  8’,.1,  8’, AR(I)
.
Coeffïcient 1.94 0.23 0 -1.10 -2.98 0.57
(4.78) (4.54) (-2.31) (-8.41) (2.80)
# Observations: 28 R’: 0.96 Durbin-Watson: 1.84
Estimation period: 1970-  1997. t-values in parentheses.
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The estimated matching function then reads,
[91 M = 1.94. v”.23 (UZ  + 0.33 * wz + 0.05 * N)O.”  .
The search effectiveness is the lowest for non-participants. Our point estimate of 0.05 is quite
close to scattered evidente  from the Labor Market Survey of The Netherlands Centra1 Bureau of
Statistics (CBS). For the late 1980s and early 1990s they report that approximately 7 percent of
the non-participants is actively searching for a job. Combining these two percentages would
imply that the search effectiveness of non-participants who  are active job seekers is somewhat
below the search effectiveness of individuals receiving unemployment insurance benefïts
(provided that we assume that al1 of these unemployed workers are active job seekers).
Furthermore, we find that the search effectiveness of individuals receiving welfare benefits is
one-third of the search effectiveness of individuals receiving unemployment insurance benefits.
Broersma and Van Ours (1999) report that scattered information from the Dutch Ministry of
Social Affairs and the CBS indicates  that 50 percent of the workers receiving welfare benefits
are actively searching for a job.
The estimated matching elasticity of job seekers, i.e. 1-a, equals 0.77. Estimates for other
OECD countries range from 0.1 to 1 .O, depending on the specification  of the matching function
and the variables used. For The Netherlands estimates of the elasticity of matching of job
seekers range from 0.3 (Gorter and Van Ours (1997),  Van Ours (1995)) to 0.7 (Broersma
(1997),  Van Ours (1995)). Apparently our estimate is wel1 in accordance with these latter
studies. Yet it should be noted that these studies use the stock of unemployed workers as a
proxy for the total effective number of search units CS,,  i=Ul, WB, N. Broersma and Van Ours
(1999) show that the estimated matching elasticity with respect to the number of job seekers in
the aggregate matching function is biased downward if only unemployed job seekers are taken
into account. They prove that ‘ignoring the non-unemployed job seekers wil1 give too low an
estimate of the supply side effect of the matching function’ (p. 87). In their empirical analysis
they use a single, rough approximation of all non-unemployed job seekers (including on-the-job
search) and find an elasticity of matching that is remarkably close to ours (0.74).
Calibration
We calibrate the model by imposing a steady state,  where  we take the average values for the
stocks over the period 1970-1997 as the steady state  level. Given the data on the flow from the
stock of unemployed workers receiving insurance benefits (UI) to the stock of unemployed
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Iworkers receiving welfare benefïts (WB),  we derive the flow rate from employment to UI
(n E+u, ) using the steady state condition for the latter. Given this flow rate we can determine
the flow rate from employment (E) to non-participation (N) from the steady state condition for
employment. Finally, using data for the flow rate from non-participation to welfare ( zN+WB )
we can derive the flow rate from the stock of workers receiving welfare benefits to non-
participation ( zWB+N) from the steady state  condition of either N or WB. Table 2 gives the
equilibrium stocks and flows of the model.
Table 2 - Equilibrium in the benchmark case
(stocks and flows x 1000)
Equilibrium Symbol Value
Stocks
Employed workers
Unemployed workers receiving unemployment
insurance benefits (effective number of job seekers)
Unemployed workers receiving welfare benefits
(effective number of job seekers)
Non-participants (effective number of job seekers)
Vacanties
E 5268
UI (&W 161 (161)
WB (&,WB)
N (edv
V
207 (68.3 1)
3634 (181.70)
86
Flow rates”
Employment to unemployment insurance
Welfare benefits to non-participation
Employment to non-participation
Non-participation to welfare benefits
Unemployment insurance to welfare benefit
~E-ilJl
7CWB-iN
nE-iN
nN+WB
nlJI-+WB
0.004
0.028
0.005
0.003
0.026
Unemployment rate u 6.53 %
“Monthly flow rates.
.
A cliometric simulution of unemployment dynamics
In order to give some indication on how  our calibrated model mimics actual developments in
the reference period, we conducted a kind of cliometric simulation where  we imputed realized
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vacanties,  and implemented an exogenous 50 percent rise in both the flow from non-
participation to welfare and the search effectiveness of non-participants in the 1980s. It appears
from Figure 2 that, given actual labor demand and the matching process [9],  the rise in job
competition from non-participants generates unemployment dynamics  with similar (persistente)
characteristics as the observed unemployment rate in The Netherlands in the relevant period (the
simple correlation coeffïcient  between the real and the simulated unemployment rate is 0.99).
Figure 2 - Cliometric simulation
Impact of a doubling of job search from non-participants, with realized vacanties
-  Cliometric simulotion
-  -  Reolized  change  in unemployment rate -
4. Impulse response simulations
A first set of impulse simulations using our calibrated stock-flow model is conducted in order to
investigate the impact of job competition from non-participants on the unemployment rate and
labor market adjustment. These simulation experiments should provide US with more
information on the (adjustment) mechanisms behind the Dutch paradox of increased
employment and persistent social benefit  dependency. More specifically we computed the
dynamic  responses to both positive and negative, and both temporary and permanent labor
supply shocks, implemented either as shocks to the inflow of non-participants, or as changes in
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the search effectiveness of non-participants. Al1 simulations are conducted under the two
altemative assumptions with respect to the response of labor demand,  namely the immediate
adjustment of the number of vacanties  in the new equilibrium and the lump of labor
assumption.
In a second’set of simulations we investigate the consequences ‘of business cycle swings on
unemployment persistente  by means of positive and negative labor demand shocks. Here
asymmetrie  reactions to shocks may explain (part of) the unemployment persistente.
Temporary positive/negative  shock to labor supply from non-participants
In Figure 3 we present the impact of a change in labor supply from non-participants where the
shock is modeled as a temporary change in the flow from non-participation to the stock of
unemployed workers receiving welfare benefïts ( z~,~~  ), i.e. unmatched additional labor
supply joins the unemployment pool. We impute a 50 percent increase in the flow rate in the
fírst  12 months of the simulation.
The effective number of job seekers rises due to the rise in the flow from non-participation to
welfare, as welfare recipients search more effectively for jobs. However, the matching
technology accommodates  only part of the shock in any ‘given period, with and without an
adjustment of the number of vacanties  to the effective number of job seekers. Hence, the
increased inflow pushes unemployment above its equilibrium level. Unemployment stays above
its equilibrium leve1 for approximately 5 year.
Next we examine the impact of a temporary rise in the search effectiveness of (or, equivalently,
number of) non-participants, where  unmatched non-participants do not flow into unemployment
but remain outside the labor force. Simulation results are given in Figure 4.
Both when the stock of vacanties  remains constant and when  it rises with the rise in the
effective number of job seekers we fínd that unemployment now is hardly affected by the rise in
the effective supply of labor. When vacanties  adjust, employment absorbs more of the
additional effective labor supply than when  vacanties  remain fixed. Note that the pool of
iadividuals receiving unemployment insurance benefïts rises slightly more when  vacanties  do
not adjust, despite the less steep rise in employment (which increases the inflow into the pool of
unemployed workers receiving unemployment insurance benefïts). Unemployed workers face
more competition from non-participants, in particular when  vacanties  do not adjust.
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The impact of the temporary rise of labor supply from non-participants on unemployment is
most pronounced when the unabsorbed additional job seekers join  the unemployment pool
(Figure 4). If we assume that unmatched non-participants remain outside the labor force, then
the impact on unemployment is limited. Figures 3 and 4 show that the impact on unemployment
of a positive and a negative shock to the inflow into unemployment and the share of non-
participants  searching for a job is symmetrie.
The impact of changes  in labor supply from non-participants on employment is most
pronounced when vacanties  adjust to the increase in labor supply. It is, however, noticeable that
the differente  between the two labor market regimes is very limited when the rise of labor
supply is modeled as an increase in the flow from non-participation to welfare (Figure 3).
Permanent positive/negative  shock to labor supply from non-participants
Figure 5 presents the results of a permanent rise of 50 percent in the flow rate from non-
participation to unemployment. After  this shift in job competition from non-participants it takes
about 25 years to reach the new equilibrium. The number of unemployed workers receiving
welfare benefits rises due to the shock and reaches its new equilibrium shortly after an initial
period of overshooting. Employment rises only slowly in the short-run, due to frictions in the
matching process.
When vacanties  adjust to the permanent rise in the effective supply of labor, employment rises
more whereas unemployment is hardly affected though by dropping the lump of labor
assumption. The number of individuals receiving unemployment insurance benefits rises due to
the higher  inflow from employment. Note that the number of unemployed workers stabilizes
rather quickly at a higher  level, whereas both non-participation and employment continue to fa11
and rise respectively.
.
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Figure3 - Effect of a temporary positive (top) and negative (bottom) change in the flow from non-participation to welfare
3a:  lump of labor assumption (V’) 3b: labor demand adjustment (V/S*)
1 4
Figure 4 - Efféct  of a temporary positive (top) and negative (bottom) change in the share of non-participants that engage in job search
4a: lump of labor assumption (V’) 4b: labor demand adjustment (V/S’)
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In the new equilibrium the stock of unemployed workers receiving welfare benefits is 60.000
persons higher  (+ 29.0 percent), employment is 169.000 persons higher  (+ 3.2 percent) and non-
participation is 234.000 persons lower (- 6.4 percent). The differente  (6.000, + 3.7 percent) is
due to the rise in the number of unemployed workers receiving unemployment insurance
benefits. On average the unemployment rate has increased from 6.5 to 7.6 percent.
Next we investigate a permanent change in the search effectiveness of non-participants. The
dynamic  adjustment path after a permanent 50 percent rise in the effective number of search
units from non-participation is presented in Figure 6. In the new equilibrium, employment has
increased with 690.000 persons (+ 13.1 percent) and non-participation has declined with almost
the same number (692.000, - 19.0 percent). Unemployment is hardly affected, since unmatched
non-participants do not join  the unemployment pool. Once again, employment absorbs more
labor when vacanties  respond to the increase in the effective supply of labor.
A permanent rise in job competition from non-participants tums out to generate  quite limited
persistente  in unemployment when  unmatched additional job seekers remain outside the labor
force because the impact on the two different stocks of unemployed workers partly cancels out.
This is due to the fact  that the higher  leve1 of employment induces a higher  inflow into
unemployment insurance, whereas it has no direct effect on the inflow into welfare. In fact,  the
flow into welfare falls due to the lower inflow from non-participation.
Temporary rise/fall in lubor demand  representing cyclicality
In our model the presence of competing non-participants reduces the responsiveness of the
unemployment rate to business cycle swings. When competition from non-participants is absent,
unemployed workers are matched to (additional) vacanties  more rapidly. When competition
from non-participants is present, a positive shock to labor demand is partly absorbed by non-
participants,  reducing the number of additional job slots available for unemployed job seekers.
Complete labor market adjustment takes about 20 years (see Figures 7a and 7b).
.
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Figu& 5 - Effect of a permanent positive (top) and negative (bottom) change in the flow from non-participation to welfare
5x lump  of labor assumption (V’) 5b: labor demand  adjustment (V/S’)
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Figure 6 - Eff&ct  of a permanent positive (top) and negative (bottom) change in the share of non-participants that engage in job search
6x lump  of labor assumption (V’) 6b: labor demand adjustment (VIS’)
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The adjustment process is much faster for unemployed workers who  receive  unemployment
insurance benefits than it is for welfare recipients. The same applies to the simulation we have
conducted with a model without job competition from non-participants. In fact,  there is virtually
no differente  in adjustment for workers receiving unemployment insurance benefits, whereas
competition from non-participants seems to extend the adjustment period for welfare recipients
with approxìmately a third.
It appears that the impact on unemployment of an identical negative shock to the stock of
vacanties  is asymmetrie;  negative shocks to labor demand raise unemployment by more than
positive shocks reduce it. When competition between unemployed and non-participants is
present, a positive labor demand shock of 50 percent temporarily lowers the unemployment rate
from its equilibrium value of 6.53 percent to 6.22 percent after about 1.5 years (a decline of 0.31
percentage points). The initial impact on the unemployment rate of a negative labor demand
shock is larger. A similar negative demand shock raises the unemployment rate to 7.04 percent,
an increase of 0.5 1 percentage points.
The asymmetry in the response of unemployment to positive and negative shocks to the number
of vacanties  is due to the diminishing returns in the aggregate matching function. A rise in the
number of vacanties  has a smaller impact on the number of matches than a fa11 in the number of
vacanties.  Note that the number of welfare recipients remains above its steady state  leve1 longer
than the number of unemployment insurance recipients. A higher  number of unemployment
insurance recipients implies a delayed rise to welfare benefit  recipients in the following periods.
Furthermore, a larger stock of non-participants implies a larger inflow from non-participation.
The asymmetrie  characteristics of labor market adjustment indicate  that cyclical disturbances
could cause persistente.  As a consequente,  duration and intensity of the labor demand shocks
determine the precise impact and persistente  effects.
.
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Figure 7a - Effect of a positive change in labor demand when there is competition for
jobs between unemployed and non-participants
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Figure 7b - Effect of a negative change in labor demand when there is competition for
jobs between unemployed and non-participants
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5. Summary and concluding remarks
The Dutch labor market in the period 1970-1997 seems to be characterized by a paradox.
Although employment rose significantly over the last decade, dependence  on social security
provisions was very persistent. Our simulations suggest that the paradox can be resolved by
considering the rise in the effective supply of labor from non-participants. A permanent rise in
the effective supply of labor from non-participants pushes equilibrium unemployment up, in
particular long-term unemployment. Whereas the unemployment rate settles at a higher  leve1
rather  quickly, employment continues to rise. In this respect the model reproduces the behavior
of these variables observed in the data. However, the dramatic  rise in unemployment arises only
when unmatched non-participants join  the unemployment pool. Increased competition from
non-participants who  remain in the pool of non-participants (i.e. claim no benefits) hardly
affects  the unemployment rate.  However, competition from non-participants does matter for
unemployment via demand shocks. We find that the larger part of swings in labor demand is
absorbed by non-participants, limiting the impact of labor demand shocks on unemployment.
So, our smal1 calibrated equilibrium search model, which pays special attention to the
adjustment mechanisms inherent in the search process,  has identified two sources of
unemployment persistente  in The Netherlands. The first source is when,  in a period of enhanced
labor force participation, non-participants enter the unemployment pool. The second source is
the occurrence of cyclical swings. The essential feature why our model generates these
outcomes, is that it includes the job competition between unemployed and non-participants in
the search process.
These results suggest two important implications for labor market policy. First, it seems feasible
to increase the employment rate by promoting labor supply from non-participation as
employment adjusts quite smoothly and the time span is not too long. Second, it is important to
take an integral approach to polities  that aim to promote labor participation and to take into
account the effect of job competition from workers outside the labor force for existing job
seekers, notably unemployed workers. Although the persistente  effect of increased job
competition might not be that large in absolute numbers, the social costs  can be substantial
when  a smal1 group at the bottom of the labor market remains inactive and, partly due to job
competition, has a very  low probability to find a job. This requires a wide range of labor market
polities,  as there is not a single policy that completely solves the Dutch paradox of employment
growth and persistent dependency on social benefit  schemes.  However, evaluation of the effects
21
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and effectiveness of individual measures from that wide range of polities  requires a model with
much more detail than the equilibrium search model in this paper.
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Appendix: Data sources and description
Al1 numbers x 1000.
Mw,
MtI
nN+WB
nUI-+WB
U I
WB
N
E
.
V
Job matching from the stock of unemployed workers receiving unemployment
‘insurance benefïts. Source: LISV (1998).
Job matching from the stock of welfare recipients. Source: Koek  (1998,200O).
Job matching of persons currently outside the labor force (non-participants).
Source: Koek (1998,200O).
Flow rate from non-participation to unemployed workers receiving welfare
benefits. Source: Koek (1998).
Flow rate from unemployed workers receiving unemployment insurance benefits to
unemployed workers receiving welfare benefits. We use data that represent
unemployed workers receiving unemployment insurance benefïts that are no longer
entitled to these benefits because they have reached the maximum term. Outflow
due to reaching the maximum term can also take place to non-participation, but we
make the reasonable assumption that these people continue to be part of the labor
market and al1 flow into welfare. Source: LISV (1998, Table 6.2).
Stock of unemployed workers receiving insurance bene%, excluding civil-
servants and self-employed. About 70 percent of the working population is covered
by unemployment insurance (WW).  Source: LISV (1998, Table 6.6 and 6.2) and
own calculations.
Stock of unemployed workers receiving welfare benefits. Source: LISV (1998,
Table 2.1) and Koek (1998).
Stock of non-participants (between 15 and 65). Source: CBS (Population Statistics)
and Koek (1998).
Employed workers (employees and self-employed) with a regular job of 12 hours a
week or more. Source: CPB (Macroeconomic time-series).
Vacanties.  Source: CBS (Monthly Social Economie  Statistics) and Muysken,
Bierings and De Regt (199 1).
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